Protestant Minorities in European States and Nations
Europe's traditional ethnic minorities and the conflicts over their place in the state and nation are the focus of continuing comparative research (Laitin, 1998; Coakley, 2003; Brubaker, 2004 Brubaker, , 2007 Kaufmann, 2004; Keating, 2001; Wimmer, 2008) . A growing literature deals with the political tensions surrounding Europe's new religious minorities, in particular Islam (Bail, 2008, 44; Fetzer and Soper, 2005) . In contrast, little attention is paid to Europe's older religious conflicts, in particular those that stem from the reformation. The exception is of course Northern Ireland, and this is most often studied as an ethnic conflict, with its religious aspects left aside.
2 Yet for long religiously informed conflict was the principal source of internal state division and the major perceived threat to state stability and security. Rather like ethnicity, religious opposition had a totalising quality, involving close-knit communities with oppositional cultures and values and different ways of life, embedded in institutions, and linked to wider geo-political struggles over national boundaries and state power.
For the two centuries that followed the reformation, states everywhere sought religious homogeneity and marginalized and persecuted their religious minorities. In the 19 th century the emphasis was on emancipation and integration, but religious identities remained strong and older conflicts frequently emerged in new guise .
Where the minority was small, conflict could be contained; where it was large or a majority in a particular region it could intensity confessional competition, challenge the form of the state and call into question its boundaries (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983;  2 It is indicative of the declining interest in religious conflict that it has needed to be argued that the Northern Ireland conflict has a religious dimension: see Ruane and Todd, 1996, pp ; Mitchell, 200 . Flora, 1999; Marx, 2003; Liedke and Wendenhorst, 1999; Colley, 1992 ; Hastings, 1997; Mews, 1982; Smith 1995; Gross 2005 with what remains of its old ones (Jenkins, 2007) . There is much to learn from revisiting these older religious tensions and the manner and extent of their resolution.
Our particular concern is with Protestant minorities in majority-Catholic countries. Despite what appears as an inexorable decline, there is also evidence of persistence and certainly of a reluctance to entirely let go. In the Protestant North where Lutheran churches are still established and where there is a financial incentive to resign from the church, relatively few do so. In France, which records the highest levels of disaffiliation and the greatest distantiation of church and state, secular as much as religious Protestants remain attached to their heritage (Baubérot 1988 ). In the Czech
Republic advanced secularism at the institutional level coexists with a much stronger personal religiosity (Lužný and Václavík, 2007) . There is also 'vicarious religion' -where those who do not believe or practice themselves want others to continue to do so, and want religion to remain part of their society (Davie, 2002) . The problem with the traditional option, however, was that British strategic calculations were changing. By the late 19 th century placating the increasingly nationalist Irish Catholic majority had a higher priority than protecting the privileges of the traditionally loyal Protestant minority. Even then the strategy didn't work.
Demands for Home Rule led on to armed insurrection and eventually after two years of a nationalist guerrilla campaign , the British government decided to cut its losses and cede the larger part of the island to an independent Irish government.
Irish independence placed Southern Protestants in the position that for centuries they had struggled to avoid: becoming a minority in a Catholic-dominated state. example of what Walter Benjamin has described as an enlisting of 'the services of theology' for political change, an imagining of the 'messianic opening' or turning point where historical patterns could be broken (Benjamin, 1969, 253-5) ? If so it raises the question of why more Irish Protestants did not respond in that way. A rational choice explanation might be given: that the balance of risks and benefits pointed in the direction of cleaving to the traditional protector and ally. But it may owe something also to the dominance within Irish Protestantism of two theological traditions: a conservative non-prophetic Anglicanism deeply attached to the status quo, and an apocalyptic evangelicalism that could not contemplate compromise with
Catholics under any circumstances.
Can any lessons be drawn from this for addressing the problems of the present, in particular the political tensions arising from the presence of new religious minorities?
One conclusion is clear. The record of the past suggests that neither modernisation, democratisation nor secularisation will be enough to resolve deep-set tensions. The long-term resolutions involved a restructuring of polity and nation in a way consistent with minority, as well as majority culture. In the past, such opportunities were rare and demanded choice, strategy and political fortune. Existing and emerging pathdependent patterns of conflict are unlikely to be overcome more easily
